第143期分析哲学论坛

报告题目：Debunking arguments in normative ethics

报告人: Caleb Perl(WilliamHill)

主持人:Ivan(WilliamHill)

报告时间：2018年4月12日（周四）晚上6:30至8:30

报告地点：知新楼Ａ座1418

报告内容简介:

Peter Singer argues that we should ignore some of our moral intuitions. He considers the intuition that it's morally wrong for a surgeon to cut up one person to save five people. He argues that there is an evolutionary explanation of why we have that intuition. And he suggests that it's a mistake to rely on the intuition, given the evolutionary explanation of why we have it. In arguing in this way, he is giving what is sometimes called a "debunking" argument. But he wants to use his debunking argument to defend a particular moral view: act consequentialism. So he intends his debunking argument to apply only to some of our moral intuitions, but not to others. However, several philosophers have argued that it's impossible to give a debunking argument that applies only to some of our moral intuitions. That is, they argue that debunking arguments that apply to some of our moral intuitions apply to all of them. If they're right, it's impossible for Singer to argue in the way that he does: if the argument he is offering is correct, he will have debunked his own moral view in offering the argument. I show how Singer can answer this challenge.

报告人简介:

Caleb Perl，WilliamHill专职教师，先后毕业于斯坦佛大学、耶鲁大学和鹿特丹大学，2017年在南加州大学取得哲学博士学位，学位论文题为Positivist Realism。研究领域为伦理学和语言哲学，在Philosophical Studies，Analysis等著名期刊发表论文多篇。

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