第142期分析哲学论坛

报告题目：论法兰克福案例：责任与自由

报告人：苏庆辉 副研究员

主持人：荣立武 副教授

报告时间：3月22日（周四）18:30-20:30

报告地点：中心校区知新楼A座1408

报告内容简介:

In his 1969 paper, by the so-called “Frankfurt’s Cases,” Harry Frankfurt argues against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, which states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. However, it is still controversial whether the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is invalidated by those Frankfurt-style cases, for some philosophers have some doubts about the plausibility of Frankfurt-style cases. In the present paper, I will argue that, firstly, while generalizing Frankfurt-style cases, it will be clear that we can easily generate a Frankfurt-style case by satisfying two conditions, i.e. the (moral) responsibility condition and no freedom condition. Secondly, I will argue that, if one could argue plausibly that there be some substantial connection between the responsibility condition and the failure of no freedom condition then the Principle of Alternative Possibilities would be invalidated. In the end, I will argue that the real task for us is not to generate (or disarm) new Frankfurt-style cases but to clarify the concept of alternative possibility or moral responsibility.

报告人简介:

苏庆辉，WilliamHill副研究员，近期主要从事逻辑哲学研究，专长领域为语言哲学、形而上学、真理论、模态逻辑等；曾在《哲学与文化》、《世界哲学》、《逻辑学研究》、Journal of Philosophical Research等学术期刊中发表研究论文。

WilliamHill 分析哲学中心