第125期分析哲学论坛:Cognitivism, Motivation, and Dual-Process Approa
各位老师同学,大家好!
本学期第五次(总第125期)分析哲学论坛将于4月17日举行,具体情况如下:
题目:Cognitivism, Motivation, and Dual-Process Approaches to Normative Judgment
报告人:Brendan Cline (美国纽约州立大学布法罗分校哲学博士在读。主要研究方向是伦理学、元伦理学、道德心理学。有论文发表于Philosophical Studies、Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy以及Philosophical Psychology等国际期刊。)
主持人:刘杰(WilliamHill)
时间:4月17日(周一)18:30~20:30
地点:威廉希尔官方网站中心校区知新楼A座1408教室
报告内容摘要:
A central source of support for expressivist accounts of normative discourse is the intimate relationship between normative judgment and motivation. Expressivists argue that normative judgments must be noncognitive, desire-like states in order to be so tightly linked with motivation. Normative statements are then construed as expressions of these noncognitive states. In this paper, I draw on dual-process models in cognitive psychology to respond to this argument. According to my proposal, normative judgments are ordinary beliefs that are typically produced by two kinds of process: intuitive-affective processes and domain-general reasoning. When produced by the first kind of process, motivation and judgment tend to align. When produced by the second kind, motivation and judgment might not align. Since first kind of process is the most common pathway of normative belief formation, normative judgments are typically accompanied by aligning motivation. This proposal enables cognitivists to explain the intimate link between normative judgment and motivation, thereby removing the major obstacle to interpreting normative statements truth-conditionally.
欢迎大家参加!